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Abstract
We investigate asymmetry of information in the context of robust approach to pricing and
hedging of financial derivatives. We consider two agents, one who only observes the stock
prices and another with some additional information, and investigate when the pricing–
hedging duality for the former extends to the latter. We introduce a general framework to
express the superhedging and market model prices for an informed agent. Our key insight
is that an informed agent can be seen as a regular agent who can restrict her attention to
a certain subset of possible paths. We use results of Hou & Obłój [25] on robust approach
with beliefs to establish the pricing–hedging duality for an informed agent. Our results
cover number of scenarios, including information arriving before trading starts, arriving
after static position in European options is formed but before dynamic trading starts or
arriving at some point before the maturity. For the latter we show that the superhedging
value satisfies a suitable dynamic programming principle, which is of independent interest.
Keywords: robust superhedging, pricing–heding duality, informed investor, asymmetry
of information, filtration enlargement, path restrictions, dynamic programming principle,
modelling with beliefs
1 Introduction
Robust approach to pricing and hedging has been an active field of research in mathematical
finance over the recent years. In this approach, instead of choosing a single probabilistic model,
one considers superhedging simultaneously under a family of models, or pathwise on a set of
feasible trajectories. Typically dynamic trading strategy in stocks and static trading, i.e. at time
zero, in some European options are allowed. This setup was pioneered in the seminal work of
Hobson [24] who obtained robust pricing and hedging bounds for lookback options. Therein, all
martingale models which calibrate to the given market option prices, and superhedging for all
canonical paths, were considered. Similar approach and setup, both in continuous and discrete
time, were used to study other derivatives and abstract pricing–hedging duality questions, see e.g.
[12, 16, 15, 17, 1, 6, 9, 21, 20, 13] and the references therein. Other papers, often intertwined
with the previous stream, focused on the case when superhedging is only required under a
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given family of probability measures or, more recently, on a given set of feasible paths, see e.g.
[30, 4, 32, 19, 11, 25] and the references therein.
The prevailing focus in the literature has been so far on the case when trading strategies
are adapted to the natural filtration F of the price process S. In contrast, our main interest
in this paper is to understand what happens when a larger filtration G is considered. One can
think of F as the filtration of an unsophisticated or small agent and G as the filtration of a
sophisticated agent who invests in acquiring additional information. Equally, G may correspond
to the filtration of an insider. In general, the two filtrations model an asymmetry of information
between the agents. We are primarily interested in the case when the additional information
does not lead to instant arbitrage opportunities but does offer an advantage and we wish to
quantify this advantage in the context of robust pricing and hedging of derivatives.
We develop pathwise approach. Our key insight is that the pricing and hedging problem
for the agent with information in G can often be reduced to that for the standard agent who
only considers a subset of the pathspace1. This allows us to use the duality results with beliefs
obtained by Hou and Obłój [25]. Specifically, we consider the price process as the canonical
process on a restriction of the space of Rd-valued continuous functions on [0, T ]. Price process
represents assets, stocks or options, which are traded continuously, subject to usual admissibility
constraints, see Definition 2.3 below. We further allow static positions in a given set of options
X whose market prices P are known. These are less liquid options which are not assumed to
be traded after time zero. The additional information could arrive both before and/or after
the static trading is executed. To account for this we add to G an additional element G−1,
{∅,Ω} ⊂ G−1 ⊂ G0 and require that the static position α is G−1-measurable. The initial cost of
such a position is αP(X ) and hence the superhedging cost of a derivative with payoff ξ, for an
agent with filtration G, is given by
V GX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) := inf
{
α(ω)P(X ) : ∃ G-admissible (α, γ) s.t. αX +
∫ T
0
γudSu ≥ ξ on Ω
}
,
where α also includes a position in cash. The pricing counterpart is obtained via
PGX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) := sup
P∈MGX ,P,Ω
EP[ξ|G−1](ω),
where the supremum is taken over G-martingale measures calibrated to the market prices P of
options X and where we take a suitable version of the conditional expectations. We show that
both V GX ,P,Ω(ξ) and P
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ) are well defined and constant on atoms of G−1.
We first focus on the case of an initial enlargement: G0 = σ(Z), for some FT -measurable
random variable Z. Initially, we treat the case when G−1 = G0 and show that the duality for
the informed agent is the same as duality for uninformed agents in Hou & Obłój [25] with
beliefs of the form {ω : Z(ω) = c}. We discuss two examples: a very specific information
Z = supt∈[0,T ] |St − 1| and a rather vague information Z = 1 {St∈(a,b) ∀t∈[0,T ]}. Subsequently, we
show that the duality also extends to the case of trivial G−1, under mild technical assumptions
on Z.
Secondly, we focus on the case when the additional information is disclosed at some time
T1 ∈ (0, T ), i.e. the filtration G is of the form: Gt = Ft for t ∈ [0, T1) and Gt = Ft ∨ σ(Z) for
t ∈ [T1, T ]. To prove the pricing–hedging duality we establish a dynamic programming principle
1When working on this paper we were made aware of a related forthcoming paper [2] which also considers
informed agents using pathwise restrictions. However the technical setup therein is closely related to the pathwise
approach developed in [5], based on Vovk’s outer measure, and the paper develops a monotonicity principle in a
similar sprit to [7].
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for both the superhedging cost V (ξ) and the market model price P (ξ). These are of independent
interest even in the case of F = G.
We note that the pricing problem for an informed agent was also examined recently in [3].
However the focus therein is very different to ours. The authors do not study the pricing–hedging
duality but instead focus on the pricing aspect PGX ,P,Ω(ξ) with a trivial G−1. They show that it
is enough to optimise over extreme measures and characterise these, in analogy to the seminal
work of Jacod-Yor [26], as the ones under which semi–static completeness holds, i.e. perfect
hedging of all suitably integrable ξ using the underlying assets and statically traded derivatives
in X . Under some further assumptions on G, semi–static completeness under Q is equivalent to
filtrations F and G coinciding under Q.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define our robust pricing and hedging
setup. In Section 3 we define the relevant pricing and hedging notions for the informed agents
and establish their characterisations via pathspace restrictions. In Section 4 we present our main
results on pricing–hedging duality under an initially enlarged filtration. Theorem 4.6 treats the
case of instantly available information and Theorem 4.10 the case when the information may
not be used to construct static portfolios. In Section 5 we study the dynamic situation when
the additional information arrives at some time T1 ∈ (0, T ). We establish relevant dynamic
programming principles in Propositions 5.2 and 5.3, and then we obtain pricing–hedging du-
ality result in Theorem 5.5. Finally, in Section 5.3, we propose a way to value the additional
information and discuss how agent’s valuation changes with the timing of information’s arrival.
2 General set-up
2.1 Traded assets
We consider a financial market with d + 1 underlying assets: a numeraire and d ∈ N risky
underlying assets. We work in a frictionless setting with no transaction costs. The prices are
denominated in the units of a numeraire, e.g. bank account, whose price is thus normalised
to 1. We suppose that the prices of the d risky underlying assets belong to the space Ωd :=
C1([0, T ],R
d
+), i.e., the space of non-negative continuous functions f from [0, T ] into R
d
+ such that
f0 = (1, ..., 1). We endow Ω
d with the sup norm ||f ||d := supt≤T |ft| with |ft| := sup1≤n≤d |f
n
t | so
that (Ωd, || · ||d) is a Polish space. We will denote by F
d
T the Borel σ-field of subsets of (Ω
d, || · ||d)
which is the σ-field generated by canonical process on Ωd.
Apart from the risky underlying assets, there may be derivative products traded on the
market. Some of these could be particularly liquid – we will assume they trade dynamically –
and others may be less liquid and only available for trading at the initial time. We only consider
European derivatives which can be seen as FdT –measurable functions X : Ω
d → R. In line with
[25], we further assume all the payoffs X are bounded and uniformly continuous. The options
traded are assumed to have a well defined price at time zero given by a linear operator P, i.e.,
P(X) is the price at time zero of the FdT -measurable, bounded and uniformly continuous payoff
X. We let X = (X λ)λ∈Λ, where Λ is a set of an arbitrary cardinality, be the vector of the payoffs
of market options available for static trading. We assume that 0 ∈ Λ and X 0 is a unit of the
numeraire, X 0(ω) = 1 for each ω ∈ Ω, so P(X 0) = 1. There are further K options, K ≥ 0, with
non-negative payoffs X
(c)
1 , ...,X
(c)
K , which are traded dynamically. We normalise their payoffs
so that their initial prices are equal to 1 and we model this situation by augmenting the set of
risky assets. We simply consider d + K assets that may be traded at any time, d underlyings
and K options, with paths in an extended path space, Ωd+K , with the norm || · || := || · ||d+K .
Specifically, as the prices at maturity T must be consistent with payoffs, only the following
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subset of Ωd+K is considered:
Ω :=
{
ω ∈ Ωd+K : ω
(d+i)
T = X
(c)
i (ω
(1), ..., ω(d))/P(X
(c)
i ) ∀i ≤ K
}
.
The space Ω was called the information space in [25] since it encodes the information about the
initial prices and the payoffs of continuously traded options. We note that (Ω, || · ||) is a Polish
space since it is a closed subset of the Polish space (Ωd+K , || · ||).
2.2 Information
Let S be the canonical process on Ω, i.e., St(ω) := ωt. We introduce the filtration F := (Ft)t≤T
generated by S, i.e., Ft := σ(Ss : s ≤ t) for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that it is not a right–continuous
filtration and each element Ft, or more generally Fτ for a stopping time τ , is countably generated
as the Borel σ-field on a Polish space.
We also consider an enlarged filtration G := (Gt)t≤T defined as Gt := Ft ∨ Ht, for each
t ∈ [0, T ], where H := (Ht)t≤T is another filtration. In the literature, e.g. [27, 28, 31], typically
two special cases of the filtration H are studied. First, the filtration H can be taken constant,
Ht = σ(Z) where Z is a random variable, and G is then called the initial enlargement of F with
Z. Second, the filtration H can be taken as Ht = σ(1 {τ≤s} : s ≤ t) where τ is a random time
(a non-negative random variable) and G is then called the progressive enlargement of F with a
random time τ .
In our considerations it is important to specify when the additional information arrives
– some decisions may have to be taken before and some after the additional information is
acquired. To model such situations, we add to each filtration G an additional element G−1 with
{∅,Ω} ⊂ G−1 ⊂ G0. For a given arbitrary filtration G we denote by G
+ the filtration such
that G+−1 = G0 and G
+
t = Gt for t ∈ [0, T ]. Similarly, we denote by G
− the filtration such that
G−−1 = {∅,Ω} and G
−
t = Gt for t ∈ [0, T ]. We note that for the natural filtration of the price
process F the only choice is F−1 = F0 = {∅,Ω}. Finally, we make the following
Standing Assumption 2.1. All σ-fields Gt, t ∈ {−1} ∪ [0, T ], in the enlarged filtration G are
countably generated.
2.3 Trading strategies
We now discuss the notion of atoms of a σ-field and introduce the right class of trading strategies
with respect to a general filtration G. We refer to Dellacherie & Meyer [18, Ch.1, §9-12] for useful
details. For a measurable space (Ω,FT ) and a sub σ-field G ⊂ FT we introduce the following
equivalence relation.
Definition 2.2. Let ω and ω˜ be two elements of Ω, and G ⊂ FT be a σ-field. Then we say that
ω and ω˜ are G-equivalent, and write ω ∼G ω˜, if for each G ∈ G we have 1G(ω) = 1G(ω˜).
We call G-atoms the equivalence classes in Ω with respect to this relation. We denote by Aω
the atom which contains ω: Aω =
⋂
{A : A ∈ G, ω ∈ A}. Note that if G is countably generated,
G = σ(Bn : n ≥ 1), then each atom is an element of G as A
ω =
⋂
nCn is a countable intersection,
where Cn = Bn if ω ∈ Bn and Cn = B
c
n if ω ∈ B
c
n. Also, it is then enough to check the relation
from Definition 2.2 on the generators of G. Finally, we note that in our setting, ω ∼Ft ω˜ if and
only if ωu = ω˜u for each u ≤ t; and ω ∼σ(Z) ω˜ if and only if Z(ω) = Z(ω˜).
In Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 we shall define trading in such a way that strategies can be chosen
separately on each atom of G0 for dynamic trading and each atom of G−1 for static trading. In
particular we do not require that the strategies are measurable on the entire Ω but allow for
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trading strategies which are measurable when restricted to appropriate atoms. It is expressed
via the set of mappings
U(G) := {M : Ω→ R s.t. ω ∼G ω˜ implies M(ω) = M(ω˜)} (1)
where G ∈ {G0,G−1}, which are only required to be constant on atoms of G. In particular,
using information contained in G does not enforce measurability. Information provided by the
σ-field G might be seen as a signal or equivalently as a partition of Ω into atoms. After receiving
a signal, an agent may decide to use it according to U(G) which is usually a much larger set
of actions than the G-measurable mappings. We believe the above is an important point and
our approach is inspired by [22] and [23] where the set of informed sets is distinguished from a
σ-field, the former allowing for uncountable sums.
We only consider trading strategies γ which are of finite variation. This allows, similarly to
[21, 25], to define integrals pathwise simply via the integration by parts formula:∫ t
0
γ(u)dω(u) := γ(t)ω(t) − γ(0)ω(0) −
∫ t
0
ω(u)dγ(u), ω ∈ Ω.
The above integration provides dynamic trading in continuously traded assets as defined below.
Definition 2.3. (i) The mapping γ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd+K is called
(a) càdlàg if for each ω ∈ Ω, γ(ω) : [0, T ] → Rd+K is càdlàg,
(b) G-adapted on atoms of G0 if for each atom A
ω of G0 the mapping γ1Aω is G-adapted.
(ii) The mapping γ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd+K is called (G,M)-admissible for M ∈ U(G0), where U(G0)
is defined in (1), if it is càdlàg, G-adapted on atoms of G0 and of finite variation, satisfying∫ t
0
γ(ω)udSu(ω) ≥ −M(ω) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω . (2)
The set of all (G,M)-admissible strategies is denoted AM (G). The set of all G-admissible strate-
gies is defined by
A(G) :=
⋃
M∈U(G0)
AM (G). (3)
Beside dynamic trading we allow for static trading in options X , which results in semi–static
trading as defined below.
Definition 2.4. (i) Let M ∈ U(G0). A (G,M)-admissible semi–static strategy is a pair (α, γ)
where γ ∈ AM(G) and α = (αλ)λ∈Λ such that for each λ ∈ Λ, α
λ ∈ U(G−1) and for each atom
of G−1, A
ω, there exists a finite subset Λω0 ⊂ Λ such that α
λ(ω) = 0 for each λ /∈ Λω0 .
(ii) The set of all (G,M)-admissible semi–static strategies is denoted by AMX (G) and all G-
admissible semi–static strategies are given by
AX (G) :=
⋃
M∈U(G0)
AMX (G). (4)
Let Aω denote an atom of G−1 and (α, γ) be a G-admissible trading strategy. Note that, for
each ω˜ ∈ Aω, the initial cost of (α, γ) equals
α(ω)P(X ) = α(ω˜)P(X ) = α0(ω˜) +
∑
λ∈Λ
αλ(ω˜)P(X λ) = α0(ω˜) +
∑
λ∈Λω0
αλ(ω˜)P(X λ).
For each ω = (ω(1), ..., ω(d), ω(d+1), ..., ω(d+K)) ∈ Ω the final payoff of (α, γ) is given by
(γ ◦ S)T (ω) + (αX )(ω) =
∫ T
0
γ(ω)udSu(ω) +
∑
λ∈Λ
αλ(ω)X λ(ω(1), ..., ω(d)). (5)
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3 Pathspace approach to information quantification
We are now in a position to define the main quantities of interest: the robust pricing and hedging
prices of an option. We work with a general filtration G and this induces further difficulties, as
compared with the case of the natural filtration F.
We start with superhedging problem.
Definition 3.1. Let A ⊂ Ω. The G-superhedging cost of ξ on A is given by
V GX ,P,A(ξ)(ω) := inf{α(ω)P(X ) : ∃ (α, γ) ∈ AX (G) such that
(γ ◦ S)T (ω˜) + (αX )(ω˜) ≥ ξ(ω˜) for each ω˜ ∈ A}, ω ∈ A,
where (γ ◦ S)T + (αX ) is defined in (5).
Thus the G-superhedging cost of ξ on A is the pathwise infimum over all initial costs αP(X )
of G-admissible semi–static strategies (α, γ) ∈ AX (G) which super–replicate ξ on A over [0, T ]
i.e., αX + (γ ◦ S)T ≥ ξ on A. We have the following obvious inequalities:
V G
+
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ V
G
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ V
G−
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ V
F
X ,P,A(ξ).
As soon as G−1 is not trivial, αP(X ) is random and hence V
G
X ,P,A(ξ) is random as well and its
measurability is not clear a priori. However, the following result shows that the superhedging
cost is constant on the atoms of G−1. In particular, when G−1 has at most countably many
atoms, e.g. is generated by a discrete random variable, then it follows that the superhedging
cost is G−1-measurable.
Proposition 3.2. The G-superhedging cost of ξ on Ω, defined in Definition 3.1, is constant on
atoms of G−1. Specifically, for any ω ∈ Ω we have
V GX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) = V
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω
′) = V GX ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω
′) ∀ω′ ∈ Aω,
where Aω denotes the G−1-atom containing ω.
Proof: Fix ω ∈ Ω and ω′ ∈ Aω. It follows from αλ ∈ U(G−1) for each λ ∈ Λ that
α(ω)P(X ) = α(ω′)P(X ) for any G-admissible strategy (α, γ) ∈ AX (G) which super–replicates
ξ on Aω. This in turn implies that
V GX ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω) = V
G
X ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω
′).
It remains to argue that these are also equal to V GX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω
′). Clearly the latter can only be
larger as the super–hedging is required on a larger set. As for the reverse inequality, note that
any G-admissible semi–static strategy (α, γ) which super–replicates ξ on Aω can be extended
to a strategy (α¯, γ¯) super–replicating on Ω by taking α¯ = α on Aω and α¯0 = ||ξ|| otherwise,
γ¯ = γ1Aω . 
With a slight abuse of notation, we write V GX ,P,Aω(ξ) both for the constant function, extended
to Ω, as well as its value equal to V GX ,P,Ω(ξ)|Aω .
We now turn to the pricing problem. In the classical approach markets with no-arbitrage
are modelled using martingale measures. We denote by MG probability measures on (Ω,FT )
such that S is a G–martingale. For a given A ∈ FT , we look at possible classical market models
which calibrate to market prices of options and are supported on A:
MGX ,P,A :=
{
P ∈ MG : P(A) = 1 and EP[X
λ|G−1] = P(X
λ) for all λ ∈ Λ, P-a.s.
}
.
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We emphasize that any measure P ∈ MGX ,P,A is calibrated to the initial prices of options in X .
In particular, for any atom Aω of G−1 one has EP[X
λ1Aω ] = EP[P(X
λ)1Aω ] for each λ ∈ Λ.
To consider the pricing problem we need to look at "supP∈MGX ,P,Ω
EP[ξ|G−1]". However,
unless G−1 is a trivial σ-field, the conditional expectation EP[ξ|G−1] is a random variable which
is determined only P-a.s. As measures in the set MGX ,P,Ω may be mutually singular we have to
be careful about choosing a good version of these conditional expectations.
Lemma 3.3. Let P ∈ MGX ,P,Ω. Then, there exists a set Ω
P ∈ G−1 with P(Ω
P) = 1 and a version
{Pω} of the regular conditional probabilities of P with respect to G−1 such that for each ω ∈ Ω
P,
Pω ∈ M
G
X ,P,Aω where A
ω is the G−1-atom containing ω.
The proof, based on standard existence results for regular conditional probabilities, is re-
ported in the Appendix. Suppose now that we fix a representation ΩP in Lemma 3.3 for each
P ∈MGX ,P,Ω and use these to define the market model price as follows:
Definition 3.4. Let A ∈ FT . The G-market model price of ξ on A is defined by
PGX ,P,A(ξ)(ω) := sup
P∈MGX ,P,A
E¯Pω [ξ], ω ∈ Ω,
where E¯Pω [ξ] = EPω [ξ] for ω ∈ Ω
P and E¯Pω [ξ] = −∞ for ω ∈ Ω\Ω
P, where ΩP is a set from
Lemma 3.3.
We note the following obvious inequalities:
PG
+
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ P
G
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ P
G−
X ,P,A(ξ) ≤ P
F
X ,P,A(ξ).
We now show that, as in the case of superhedging, the model price is constant on atoms of G−1
and is uniquely defined, irrespective of the choice of ΩP above. It follows that, while in general
the measurability of PGX ,P,Ω(ξ) is not clear, when G−1 has at most countably many atoms then
PGX ,P,Ω(ξ) is G−1-measurable.
Proposition 3.5. The G-market model price of ξ on Ω is uniquely defined on Ω and is constant
on atoms of G−1. Specifically, for ω ∈ Ω we have
PGX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) = P
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω
′) = PGX ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω
′) = sup
P∈MG
X ,P,Aω
EP[ξ], ∀ω
′ ∈ Aω,
where Aω is the G−1-atom containing ω.
Proof: Note that if P ∈ MGX ,P,Aω , then A
ω ⊂ ΩP and Pω′ = P for all ω
′ ∈ Aω. In
particular, PGX ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω
′) = supP∈MG
X ,P,Aω
EP[ξ] for all ω
′ ∈ Aω, i.e. PGX ,P,Aω(ξ) is well defined
and constant on Aω. Further, the obvious inclusionMGX ,P,Aω ⊂M
G
X ,P,Ω combined with Lemma
3.3, show that the setMGX ,P,Aω is composed of conditional probabilities of measures inM
G
X ,P,Ω.
In consequence,
PGX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω
′) = PGX ,P,Aω(ξ)(ω
′), ω′ ∈ Aω
as required. In particular, PGX ,P,Ω(ξ) is well defined and constant on atoms and does not depend
on the choice of ΩP for P ∈ MGX ,P,Ω. Finally, if for some ω ∈ Ω, M
G
X ,P,Aω = ∅ then, for any
P ∈ MGX ,P,Ω, Ω
P ∩Aω = ∅ and the definitions agree giving
MGX ,P,Ω(ω) = −∞.

With a slight abuse of notation, we write PGX ,P,Aω(ξ) both for the constant function, extended
to Ω, as well as its value equal to supP∈MG
X ,P,Aω
EP[ξ] = P
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ)|Aω .
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Remark 3.6. We note that Proposition 3.5 implies that when computing the G-market model
price of ξ on Ω, or on some set in G−1, it is sufficient to maximise over measures supported on a
single atom of G−1. Such measures are not necessarily the extreme measures in M
G
X ,P,Ω, which
were the focus in [3].
Remark 3.7. In this paper we are interested in information which may affect pricing and
hedging. Other, “irrelevant”, information can be modelled via enlargement of measurable space
(Ω,FT ) in the following way. Let Ω˜ = Ω × Ω
′ where (Ω
′
,G) is another measurable space, and
denote ω˜ := (ω, u) ∈ Ω × Ω′. Assume that additional information is provided by Z : Ω˜ → R
satisfying Z(ω˜) = Z(u). As before we may considered G = F ∨ σ(Z), where filtration F can
be naturally interpreted on (Ω˜,FT ⊗ G). Then, any atom A
(ω,u) of G0 (resp. G−1) is equal to
(resp. contained in) Ω × {v : Z(v) = Z(u)}. In particular, Z does not affect the martingale
condition, M(G) = M(F) and γF = γG(c) for any c ∈ Z(Ω) etc., and the pricing problem
is unchanged by the addition of the information carried by Z. Such situation was considered
in the Q-quasi-sure reduced form modelling in Biagini [8], where (Ω
′
,G) = ([0, 1],B([0, 1])) by
imposing Q˜ = {Q˜ := Q× U([0, 1]) : Q ∈ Q}.
4 Pricing–hedging duality under initially enlarged filtration
Our first contribution in this paper, developed in Propositions 3.2 and 3.5 above, was to describe
the superhedging cost and the pricing problem for an agent with additional information. We
turn now to our second main contribution: understanding when pricing–hedging duality for a
regular agent carries over to the informed one? It is straightforward to see that an inequality
holds in general:
Lemma 4.1. The G-superhedging cost V GX ,P,Ω(ξ) and the G-market model price P
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ) of ξ
on Ω satisfy
V GX ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) ≥ P
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω .
Thanks to the results of Section 3, the proof is carried out on atoms of G−1 and is reported
in Appendix. Our goal in this section is to provide sufficient conditions for equality in the
above inequality. We start with the case when G is an initial enlargement of F. Then, γ is
G-progressively measurable if and only if γ(ω)t = γ(ω˜)t whenever ω|[0,t] = ω˜|[0,t] and ω ∼G0 ω˜.
4.1 Preliminaries: pricing–hedging duality with beliefs
We start by recalling notions and results from Hou & Obłój [25]. As explained before, we use
their setup with beliefs to zoom in on the part of the pathspace considered by an informed agent.
For P ∈ FT let V˜
F
X ,P,P(ξ) be the approximate F-superhedging cost of ξ on P, i.e.,
V˜ FX ,P,P(ξ) := inf{αP(X ) : ∃(α, γ) ∈ AX (F) such that
(γ ◦ S)T (ω) + (αX )(ω) ≥ ξ(ω) ∀ ω ∈ P(ε) for some ε > 0},
where
P(ε) = {ω ∈ Ω : inf
ω˜∈P
||ω − ω˜|| ≤ ε}. (6)
Similarly, let P˜ FX ,P,P(ξ) be the approximate F-market model price of ξ, i.e.,
P˜ FX ,P,P(ξ) := lim
ηց0
sup
P∈MF,ηX ,P,P
EP[ξ]
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with MF,ηX ,P,P := {P ∈ M
F
Ω : P(P(η)) > 1− η and |EP[X
λ]− P(X λ)| < η for all λ ∈ Λ }.
The following assumption says that the vector X is not too large, and initial prices of dynamically
traded options are not "on the boundary of no-arbitrage region".
Assumption 4.2. (i) Lin1(X ) is a compact subset of C(Ω,R), where LinN (X ) is given by{∑
λ∈Λ
αλX λ : α = (αλ)λ∈Λ ∈ R
Λ with finitely many αλ 6= 0 and
∑
λ∈Λ
|αλ| ≤ N
}
. (7)
(ii) Either K = 0 or there exists an ε > 0 such that for any (pk)k≤K with |P(X
(c)
k )− pk| ≤ ε for
all k ≤ K, MF
Ω˜
6= ∅ where
Ω˜ = {ω ∈ Ω : S
(d+i)
T (ω) = X
(c)
i (ω)/pi ∀ i ≤ K}.
Theorem 4.3 (Hou & Obłój [25]). Suppose that Assumption 4.2 holds. Let P ∈ FT be such that
MF,ηX ,P,P 6= ∅ for any η > 0. Then, for any uniformly continuous and bounded ξ, the approximate
pricing–hedging duality holds:
V˜ FX ,P,P(ξ) = P˜
F
X ,P,P(ξ).
Let us consider a general filtration G and assume that MGX ,P,Ω 6= ∅. The above results on
Ω without options (i.e., PGΩ (ξ) = V
G
Ω (ξ)) extend to the case with static hedging in options by
applying min–max type of argument exactly in the same spirit as in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [25].
Hence, as a corollary of the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [25] we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.4. Let G be an arbitrary filtration such that G−1 is a trivial σ-field. Suppose that
Assumption 4.2 holds and that MGX ,P,Ω 6= ∅. Moreover assume that there is pricing–hedging
duality for the model without options, i.e., PGΩ (ξ) = V
G
Ω (ξ) for all uniformly continuous and
bounded ξ. Then
P˜GX ,P,Ω(ξ) = V˜
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ) = V
G
X ,P,Ω(ξ) for all uniformly continuous and bounded ξ.
4.2 Duality in an enlarged filtration: case of G+
From Theorem 4.3, taking P to be atoms in G+−1 = G0, we can deduce a pricing–hedging duality
in the enlarged filtration. We isolate the following assumption which is often invoked.
Assumption 4.5. The set P ∈ FT is such that M
F
X ,P,P 6= ∅, and
P FX ,P,P(ξ) = V
F
X ,P,P(ξ) for any bounded uniformly continuous ξ. (8)
Theorem 4.6. Suppose Assumption 4.2 holds and let Z be a random variable and G :=
F ∨ σ(Z). Assume that for each value c ∈ Z(Ω) either {Z = c} satisfies Assumption 4.5 or
MFX ,P,{Z=c} = ∅. Then, there is no duality gap in G
+ on the set {ω :MFX ,P,{Z=Z(ω)} 6= ∅}, i.e.,
V G
+
X ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) = P
G+
X ,P,Ω(ξ)(ω) holds for any ω such that M
F
X ,P,{Z=Z(ω)} 6= ∅ and any bounded
uniformly continuous ξ.
Proof: In the first step we prove that for each value c ∈ Z(Ω) such that MFX ,P,{Z=c} 6= ∅
we have
P FX ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) = P
G+
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) ≤ V
G+
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) = V
F
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ). (9)
First let us prove the last equality. To this end note that any G+-progressively measurable
process γ is of the form γ(ω)t = Γ(Z(ω), t, ω) where for each t ∈ [0, T ] the mapping Γ : R ×
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[0, t]×Ω→ Rd+K+ is B(R)⊗B([0, t])⊗Fs-measurable. So there exists F-progressively measurable
process γF given by γF(t, ω) = Γ(c, t, ω) which is equal to γ on {Z = c} thus the last equality in
(9) follows.
To show the first equality, it suffices to show that MG
+
X ,P,{Z=c} = M
F
X ,P,{Z=c}. For any P ∈
MFX ,P,{Z=c} and 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T we have
EP[St|G
+
s ] = EP[St|Fs ∨ σ(Z)] = EP[EP[St|F
P
s ]|Fs ∨ σ(Z)] = EP[Ss|Fs ∨ σ(Z)] = Ss,
where FPs is a P-completion of Fs, showing P ∈ M
G+
X ,P,{Z=c}. The reverse inclusion is clear.
Finally, the middle inequality in (9) is implied by Lemma 4.1.
By representations given in Propositions 3.2 and 3.5, the proof is completed since we get
that V G
+
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) = P
G+
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) for any value c ∈ Z(Ω) for which M
F
X ,P,{Z=c} 6= ∅ and any
bounded uniformly continuous claim ξ. 
Remark 4.7. Under Assumption 4.2, thanks to Theorem 4.3, we have
V˜ FX ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) = P˜
F
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ). (10)
Combining equality (10) with the following general inequalities
P FX ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) ≤ V
F
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) ≤ V˜
F
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ)
we conclude that in Theorem 4.6, instead of assuming that (8) holds, it is enough to assume that
P FX ,P,{Z=c}(ξ) = P˜
F
X ,P,{Z=c}(ξ).
We present now two examples where the informed agent has additional knowledge about the
price process at the terminal date. These corresponds to two very different situations: first when
the informed agent gets rather detailed information and there is a continuum of atoms, second
when the informed agent gets binary information (and G−1 only has two atoms). In both cases
we only consider the situation with no static trading: Λ = {0} and such that pricing–hedging
duality in G+ holds.
Example 4.8. Consider a one-dimensional setting with no statically or dynamically traded
options: d = 1, K = 0 and Λ = {0}. The informed agent acquires detailed knowledge of the
stock price process: namely she knows the maximum deviation over time interval [0, T ] of the
stock price from the initial price. Naturally, the agent does not know the sign of the deviation as
this would give an instant arbitrage. This situation corresponds to taking Z = supt∈[0,T ] |St−1|.
For c > 1, the market model price PG
+
{Z=c}(ξ) = −∞ as any martingale measure P ∈ M
G+
{Z=c}
would satisfy
1 = P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
St ≥ 1 + c
)
≤
1
1 + c
< 1,
thus the set of martingale measures MG
+
{Z=c} must be empty. Likewise the super–hedging cost
V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) = −∞ as a long position in the stock generates arbitrage.
Fix c ≤ 1. Our proof is similar to Example 3.12 in [25]. Firstly observe that under any
P ∈ MG
+
{Z=c}, S is a uniformly integrable martingale with S = S
τc P-a.s. where τc := inf{t :
St ∈ {1 + c, 1− c}}.
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For each N there exists a measure PN ∈ M
F,1/N
{Z=c} such that
EPN [ξ] ≥ sup
P∈M
F,1/N
{Z=c}
EP[ξ]−
1
N
.
Since PN is a martingale measure for S, Doob’s martingale inequality implies:
PN(||S|| > M) ≤
1
M
,
and then, defining τM := inf{t : St = M} for an arbitrary large M , leads to:
|EPN [ξ(S)− ξ(S
τM )]| ≤
2||ξ||
M
.
Let πN be the distribution of SτMT under P
N , for N ∈ N. Since πN ([0,M ]) = 1 for each N , this
is a tight family of probability measures and therefore a converging subsequence (πNk)k exists.
Denote the limit of (πNk)k by π and note that, since each measure π
N has mean equal to one
so does π.
For each ε > 0, weak convergence of measures and Portemanteau Theorem imply that
π([1− c− ε, 1 + c+ ε]) ≥ lim sup
k→∞
πNk([1− c− ε, 1 + c+ ε]) = 1 (11)
since, letting UN := [1− c−
1
N , 1 + c+
1
N ], one has
PN (SτMT ∈ UN ) = P
N (||S|| ≤M, ST ∈ UN ) ≥ P
N (||S|| ≤ c+ 1, ST ∈ UN ) ≥ 1−
1
N
.
It holds for each ε > 0 hence π([1 − c, 1 + c]) = 1. Finally,
P˜ F{Z=c} = lim
N→∞
sup
P∈M
F,1/N
{Z=c}
EP[ξ] ≤ lim
N→∞
(
EPN [ξ] +
1
N
)
≤ lim sup
k→∞
sup
P∈MF s.t. L(ST )=pi
Nk
EP[ξ] +
2||ξ||
M
≤ sup
P∈MF s.t. L(ST )=pi
EP[ξ] +
2||ξ||
M
≤ sup
P∈MF
{Z=c}
EP[ξ] +
2d||ξ||
M
where the fourth inequality holds by Lemma 4.4 in [25] and the fifth since under any P ∈ MF{Z=c}
the distribution of ST equals π. Since M was arbitrary we obtain that P˜
F
{Z=c} ≤ P
F
{Z=c} and by
Theorem 4.6 and Remark 4.7 we conclude that there is no duality gap in G+.
Example 4.9. Assume X = ∅, d = 1 and K = 0. Take Z = 1 {St∈(a,b) ∀t∈[0,T ]} where a < 1 < b.
We use Theorem 4.6 to show that the pricing–hedging duality holds in G+.
Equality P F{Z=0}(ξ) = P˜
F
{Z=0}(ξ) follows by the same arguments used in the previous example
and the proof of Example 3.12 in [25] since the set [0, a] ∪ [b,M ] is compact for any M . The
only difference lies in arguing an analogous inequality to (11). Here we have
π([0, a + ε] ∪ [b− ε,∞)) ≥ lim sup
k→∞
πNk([0, a+ ε] ∪ [b− ε,∞)) = 1
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since
PN(SτMT ∈ [0, a+ 1/N ] ∪ [b− 1/N,∞)) ≥ P
N (ST ∈ [0, a+ 1/N ] ∪ [b− 1/N,∞)) ≥ 1−
1
N
.
It holds for each ε > 0 and hence π([0, a] ∪ [b,∞)) = 1.
To prove that P F{Z=1}(ξ) = P˜
F
{Z=1}(ξ) we first note that, again by the same type of arguments
as in the proof of Example 3.12, for the interval [a, b] we have
P F{St∈[a,b] ∀t∈[0,T ]}(ξ) = P˜
F
{St∈[a,b] ∀t∈[0,T ]}
(ξ) = P˜ F{Z=1}.
Thus, in order to show that P F{Z=1}(ξ) = P˜
F
{Z=1}(ξ) it is enough to prove that
P F{St∈[a,b] ∀t∈[0,T ]}(ξ) = P
F
{Z=1}(ξ).
Take P ∈ MF{St∈[a,b] ∀t∈[0,T ]}. For each k ∈ (0, 1) define S˜
k as
S˜kt (ω) := kωt + (1− k) for ω ∈ {St ∈ [a, b] ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Then
P ◦ (S˜k)−1 ∈ MF{ST∈(a,b)} and ||S˜
k(ω)− ω|| ≤ (1− k)[(b − 1) ∨ (1− a)].
Thus
|EP[ξ]− EP[ξ ◦ S˜
k]| ≤ eξ((1− k)[(b− 1) ∨ (1− a)])
and, since k is arbitrary close to 1, there exists sequence of measures PN ∈ MF{ST∈(a,b)} such
that EP[ξ] = limN→∞ EPN [ξ].
4.3 Duality in an enlarged filtration: case of G−
We turn now to the pricing–hedging duality in G− in the case Λ = {0}. We recall that G−−1 =
{∅,Ω} which models the situation when the static position in X 0 has to be determined before
acquiring any additional information.
Theorem 4.10. Assume that Λ = {0}. Let Z be a random variable such that for each c ∈
Z(Ω) the set {Z = c} satisfies Assumption 4.5. Define G = F ∨ σ(Z). Assume moreover that
MG
−
X ,P,Ω 6= ∅. Then pricing–hedging duality holds in G
−:
V G−Ω (ξ) = P
G−
Ω (ξ) ∀ bounded uniformly continuous ξ.
Proof: We will prove the following sequence of equalities
V G
−
Ω (ξ) = sup
c∈Z(Ω)
V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) = sup
c∈Z(Ω)
PG
+
{Z=c}(ξ)
= sup
P∈
⋃
c∈Z(Ω)M
G+
{Z=c}
EP[ξ] = sup
P∈MG
−
Ω
EP[ξ] = P
G−
Ω . (12)
Let us start with first equality. Since for each c ∈ Z(Ω), V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) ≤ V
G−
Ω (ξ), we get that
supc∈Z(Ω) V
G+
{Z=c}(ξ) ≤ V
G−
Ω (ξ). To show the reverse inequality, fix ε > 0. Then, for each
c ∈ Z(Ω), there exists γc ∈ A(G) such that
V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) + ε+ (γ
c ◦ S)T ≥ ξ on {Z = c}.
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Define the strategy γ as γ(ω) =
∑
c∈Z(Ω) γ
c(ω)1 {Z(ω)=c}, which belongs to A(G) and satisfies
sup
c∈Z(Ω)
V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) + ε+ (γ ◦ S)T ≥ ξ on Ω.
Then, from the definition of super–hedging cost, we conclude that
sup
c∈Z(Ω)
V G
+
{Z=c}(ξ) + ε ≥ V
G−
Ω (ξ).
As ε > 0 was arbitrary one has supc∈Z(Ω) V
G+
{Z=c}(ξ) ≥ V
G−
Ω (ξ).
By our assumption {ω :MF{Z=Z(ω)} 6= ∅} = Ω and pricing–hedging duality holds on {Z = c}
for each c ∈ Z(Ω). Thus the second equality in (12) follows. Whereas the third and fifth
equalities in (12) hold by definition. To show the fourth one, note that, one inequality is im-
mediate since for any c,MG
+
{Z=c} ⊂M
G−
Ω and the other inequality then follows by Lemma 3.3. 
Remark 4.11. We would like to emphasize that we do not have supremum representation as
in (12) neither for V G−Ω nor for P
G−
Ω when we consider the case of Λ 6= {0}. The static hedging
position may have opposite direction on different atoms and therefore simple aggregation is not
possible. Similarly, calibration on each atom separately is much more restrictive condition than
unconditional calibration.
5 Timing of information arrival, dynamic programming principle
and pricing–hedging duality
To extend the initial enlargement perspective we study now the case where the additional infor-
mation is disclosed at time T1 ∈ (0, T ), i.e. the filtration G is of the form: Gt = Ft for t ∈ [0, T1)
and Gt = Ft ∨ σ(Z) for t ∈ [T1, T ]. We divide our problem into two time intervals using the
results from the previous sections. First we look at the pricing and hedging problems on [T1, T ]
and then on [0, T1]. Along this section we assume that there are no dynamically traded options,
i.e., K = 0. Moreover we assume that Z is of a special form, namely, Z satisfies
Z(ω) =
{
Z˜
(
ω|[T1,T ]
ωT1
)
if ωT1 > 0
1 if ωT1 = 0
for a r.v. Z˜ on Ω|[T1,T ]. (13)
This condition encodes the idea that the additional information only pertains to the evolution
of prices after time T1 irrespectively of the prices on, or before, time T1.
5.1 Dynamic programming principle for V G and PG
We begin with two propositions where we develop the dynamic programming principle for the
superhedging cost and the market model price. Note that the case Z ≡ const and F = G is also
of interest, as it gives the dynamic programming principle under F.
Lemma 5.1. Let Ω+ = {ω ∈ Ω : ωT1 > 0}. For each v ∈ Ω+ define the mapping a
v on Ω+×Ω+
with values in Ω+ by
av(v˜, ω) :=

v|[0,T1] ⊗
vT1
v˜T1
ω|[T1,T ] ω ∈ B
v˜
v˜|[0,T1] ⊗
v˜T1
vT1
ω|[T1,T ] ω ∈ B
v
ω ω /∈ Bv ∪Bv˜
(14)
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where λω is a multiplicative modification of ω by λ in Ω and v|[0,T1] ⊗ λω|[T1,T ] means that the
path is equal to v on [0, T1] and to λω| on [T1, T ].
Then, av is FT ⊗FT -measurable.
The proof simply exploits the defining properties of av and is reported in Appendix. To
formulate the dynamic programming principle for the superhedging cost we naturally extend
the notions introduced in Definition 2.3 on the time interval [0, T ] to a subinterval [T1, T2] ⊂
[0, T ] and let AM(G, [T1, T2]) denote (G, [T1, T2],M)-admissible strategies and A(G, [T1, T2])
their union over M ∈ Λ(G0). Similarly, we Define the set of measures M
G,[T1,T ]
A concentrated on
A ∈ FT as follows:
M
G,[T1,T ]
A := {P : S is a G-martingale on [T1, T ] and P(A) = 1}.
The following two results establish suitable regularity and dynamic programming principle for
the superhedging cost and the pricing operator.
Proposition 5.2. Let Bω denote the FT1-atom containing ω. Then for a bounded uniformly
continuous ξ the following hold:
(i) The mapping V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ) : Ω→ R defined as
V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) := inf
{
x ∈ R : ∃ γ ∈ A(G, [T1, T ]) such that x+
∫ T
T1
γtdSt ≥ ξ on B
ω
}
is uniformly continuous and FT1-measurable.
(ii) The dynamic programming principle holds in the form:
V
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ) = V
F,[0,T1]
Ω
(
V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)
)
.
Proposition 5.3. Let Bω denote the FT1-atom containing ω and assume that M
G,[T1,T ]
Bω 6= ∅ for
each ω. Then for a bounded uniformly continuous ξ the following hold.
(i) The mapping P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ) defined as P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) := supP∈MG,[T1,T ]Bω
EP[ξ] is uniformly con-
tinuous and FT1-measurable.
(ii) The dynamic programming principle holds in the form:
P
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ) = P
F,[0,T1]
Ω (P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)).
Remark 5.4. The dynamic programming principle for P stated in Proposition 5.3 (ii) is linked
to conditional sublinear expectations studied in [33, Theorem 2.3]. Since there is more structure
in our set-up we prove it relying on uniform continuity of ξ instead of a general analytic selection
argument.
While both Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 seem natural their proofs are longer than one might
expect and require certain technical details. We present them in Appendix. In particular, we
note that Assumption (13) is important in the proofs and one would not expect such results
to hold for an arbitrary Z. Indeed, consider for exmaple Z = | lnST − lnST1 |1 {ST1=c}∩{ST>0},
which violates (13). It is easy to see that in this case we can not guarantee the uniform continuity
of V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ) or P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ).
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5.2 Pricing–hedging duality
We show now that pricing-hedging duality holds for an agent with information flow G. This is
done using analogous arguments to those in Sections 3 and 4 and treating independently each
atom Bω of FT1 . Firstly, as in Theorem 4.6 for the corresponding G
+ filtration, we look at the
intersections with each level set of r.v. Z, namely at the sets Bω∩{Z = c} which form the atoms
of GT1 . Secondly we aggregate over Z, as in Theorem 4.10 for the corresponding G
− filtration.
The described operation reduces the problem to [0, T1] interval where G coincides with F where
we conclude by dynamic programming principle.
Theorem 5.5. Assume that there are no options, i.e., Λ = {0}. Let Z be a random variable
such that for each c ∈ Z(Ω) and each FT1-atom B
ω the set {Z = c} ∩ Bω satisfies Assumption
4.5 on [T1, T ]. Assume moreover that M
G
Ω 6= ∅ and that Assumption 4.2 holds. Then for any
bounded uniformly continuous ξ
V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) = P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) ∀ω and V
G
Ω (ξ) = P
G
Ω (ξ).
Proof: We use the previous subsection to show the following equalities:
V
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ) = V
F,[0,T1]
Ω (V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)) = V
F,[0,T1]
Ω (P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ))
= P
F,[0,T1]
Ω (P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)) = P
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ).
After applying Propositions 5.2 and 5.3, it remains to show the second and third equalities.
To prove the second equality stating that P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ) = V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ) firstly we remark some
analogies with Section 3. Defining the (G+, [T1, T ])-superhedging cost V
G+,[T1,T ]
A as
V
G+,[T1,T ]
A := inf{x ∈ GT1 : ∃ γ ∈ A(G, [T1, T ]) such that x+
∫ T
T1
γudSu ≥ ξ on A},
analogously to Proposition 3.2 we have that
V
G+,[T1,T ]
Bω (ω
′) = V
G+,[T1,T ]
Bω∩{Z=Z(ω′)} for each ω and each ω
′ ∈ Bω.
Analogously to Proposition 3.5, we deduce that
P
G+,[T1,T ]
Bω (ω
′) = P
G+,[T1,T ]
Bω∩{Z=Z(ω′)} for each ω and each ω
′ ∈ Bω.
Then, by mimicking the proof of Theorem 4.10, we pass from "G+ to G−", and derive that
V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) = P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)(ω) ∀ω.
The third equality follows by general duality result on [0, T1]. 
Example 5.6. Analogously to Example 4.8 let us look at the additional information in dynamic
set-up which consists of a very detailed knowledge. We consider a one-dimensional setting with
no statically or dynamically traded options: d = 1, K = 0 and Λ = {0}. The informed agent
acquires at time T1 detailed knowledge of the stock prices process of the form
Z =
{
supt∈[T1,T ] | lnSt − lnST1 | St > 0 ∀ t ∈ [T1, T ]
1 otherwise
.
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Note that for each c ∈ Z(Ω) and each FT1-atom B
ω, one has that
M
G,[T1,T ]
{Z=c}∩Bω =M
F,[T1,T ]
{Z=c}∩Bω 6= ∅
where the first equality holds since each {Z = c} ∩Bω is a GT1-atom. To show that
P
F,[T1,T ]
{Z=c}∩Bω = P˜
F,[T1,T ]
{Z=c}∩Bω
we use the same arguments as in Example 4.8. Thus Assumption 4.5 with no options (Λ = {0})
on [T1, T ] is satisfied for each each set {Z = c} ∩B
ω. Moreover note that, by concatenation of
measure argument, MGΩ 6= ∅ and, since Λ = {0}, Assumption 4.2 is also satisfied. We now apply
Theorem 5.5 to show that there is no duality gap in G.
Example 5.7. Analogously to Example 4.9 we consider the additional information in dynamic
set-up of binary type. The same as before we consider a one-dimensional setting with no statically
or dynamically traded options: d = 1, K = 0 and Λ = {0}. The informed agent acquires at
time T1 knowledge of of the form
Z = 1{
a<
St
ST1
<b ∀ t∈[T1,T ]
} where a < 1 < b.
Along the lines of Example 5.6, applying Theorem 5.5, we deduce that there is no duality gap
in G.
5.3 The timing and value of information
We explore now how an agent might value the additional information carried by Z and if the
timing of the arrival of such an information makes a difference. On one hand, in line with
considering superhedging prices, our agent always considers the worst case to evaluate the added
value of the information. On the other hand however, she is free to consider any payoff she
wishes to best capture such added value. As highlighted above, our assumption (13) encoded
the idea that the additional information only pertains to the evolution of prices after time T1
irrespectively of the prices on, or before, time T1. As we show below, agent’s flexibility to build
custom payoff ξ to best leverage the arriving information, means that she does not mind when
the information arrives, as long as it arrives strictly after time zero and before time T . If the
information arrives at time t = 0, the agent may not have time to enter into a suitable position
to later exploit the arriving information and hence may associate lower value to such scenario.
To formalise the above discussion, let Z : C([0, 1]) → R be a random variable. Then, for
each T1 ∈ [0, T ), define a random variable Z
T1 : C([0, T ])→ R by
ZT1(ω) = Z
((
ωt(T−T1)+T1
ωT1
)
t∈[0,1]
)
.
Such a ZT1 clearly satisfies condition (13). We denote by GT1 the corresponding enlargement
of filtration, i.e., the filtration of the form GT1t = Ft for t ∈ [0, T1) and G
T1
t = Ft ∨ σ(Z
T1) for
t ∈ [T1, T ].
When hedging a payoff ξ the agent considers the minimal advantage brought by the additional
information:
vT1(Z; ξ) := inf
ω∈Ω
(
V FΩ (ξ)− V
GT1
Ω (ξ)(ω)
)
T1 ∈ [0, T ), (15)
where the infimum over Ω only plays a role for T1 = 0 since V
GT1
Ω (ξ)(ω) = V
GT1
Ω (ξ) is a constant
for T1 > 0. To evaluate the robust advantage associated to the information Z we need to
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normalise the payoffs. Let Φ denote the set of uniformly continuous functions ξ : Ω → [0, 1].
Then the value of receiving information Z at time T1 for the superhedging problem is given by
vT1(Z) := sup
ξ∈Φ
vT1(Z; ξ), T1 ∈ [0, T ). (16)
Theorem 5.8. Let Z : C([0, 1]) → R be given and assume that Λ = {0}. Then:
(i) for any T1 ∈ (0, T ) and ξ ∈ Φ there exists ξ˜ ∈ Φ such that v0(Z; ξ) = vT1(Z; ξ˜),
(ii) for any T1 ∈ (0, T ), T
′
1 ∈ (0, T ) and ξ ∈ Φ there exists ξ
′ ∈ Φ such that vT1(Z; ξ) = vT ′1(Z; ξ
′).
In consequence,
v0(Z) ≤ vT1(Z) = vT ′1(Z), 0 < T1 < T
′
1 < T.
Proof: (i) For given T1 ∈ (0, T ) and ξ let us define ξ˜ by
ξ˜(ω) := ξ
((
ωt(T−T1)/T+T1
ωT1
)
t∈[0,T ]
)
,
where 00 = 1. Then, by dynamic programming principle given in Proposition 5.2,
V FΩ (ξ˜) = V
F,[0,T1]
Ω
(
V
F,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ˜)
)
= V
F,[0,T1]
Ω
(
V FΩ (ξ)
)
= V FΩ (ξ).
By analogous argument we also obtain that V G
T1
Ω (ξ˜) = V
G0−
Ω (ξ). It remains to note that, by
(12), v0(ξ) = V FΩ (ξ)− V
G0,−
Ω (ξ).
(ii) For given T1 ∈ (0, T ), T
′
1 ∈ (0, T ) and ξ let us define ξ
′ ∈ Φ by ξ′(ω) := ξ(ωκ) where κ is
the following time change
κ(t) := t
T1
T ′1
1 {t∈[0,T ′1]} +
T1(T − t) + T (t− T
′
1)
T − T ′1
1 {t∈(T ′1,T ]}.
Then, by Proposition 5.2 and the form of additional information Z, it holds that vT1(ξ) = vT
′
1(ξ′).

A Proofs of Lemmas 3.3, 4.1 & 5.1, and Propositions 5.2 & 5.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Existence of Pω and its properties are all classical results, see Stroock & Varadhan [34, pp. 12–
16]. Since, by Standing Assumption 2.1, G−1 = σ(B
−1
n , n ≥ 1), there exists a set Ω−1 ∈ G−1
such that P(Ω−1) = 1 and Pω(A
ω) = 1 for each ω ∈ Ω−1.
Fix t ≥ s and G ∈ Gs. Then, since G0 := {EPω [(St − Ss)1G] > 0} ∈ G−1, we get
0 = EP[(St − Ss)1G∩G0 ] = EP[EP[(St − Ss)1G|G−1]1G0 ] = EP[EPω [(St − Ss)1G]1G0 ],
which implies that P-a.s. EPω [(St−Ss)1G] ≤ 0. In the same way we prove that P-a.s. EPω [(St−
Ss)1G] ≥ 0. So finally, P-a.s. EPω [(St − Ss)1G] = 0 and therefore there exits a set Ωs,t,G ∈ G−1
such that P(Ωs,t,G) = 1 and EPω [(St − Ss)1G] = 0 for each ω ∈ Ωs,t,G. To conclude that there
exists a set Ωm ∈ G−1 such that P(Ωm) = 1 and S is a (Pω,G)-martingale for every ω ∈ Ωm we
use continuity of paths of S and Standing Assumption 2.1. Finally we note that
P-a.s. ∀λ ∈ Λ P(X λ) = EP[X
λ|G−1] = EPω [X
λ]
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and therefore there exists a set ΩX ∈ G−1 such that P(ΩX ) = 1 and, for every ω ∈ ΩX it
holds that P(X λ) = EPω [X
λ] for each λ ∈ Λ. To complete that proof it is enough to take
ΩP = Ω−1 ∩ Ωm ∩ ΩX . 
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
Using Propositions 3.2 and 3.5, it is enough to show the asserted inequality separately on each
atom Aω of the σ-field G−1. The proof then follows by a classical argument. Take any G-
admissible super–replicating portfolio (α, γ) ∈ AX (G) on A
ω and any measure P ∈ MGX ,P,Aω .
Let {Pv} denote regular conditional probabilities of P with respect to G0. Thus, by Lemma 3.3,
P-a.s., Pv ∈ M
G
Bv where {B
v} are G0-atoms containing v. Note that {B
v} form finer partition
than {Aω}. Then, since P-a.s., Pv(M ≡ const) = 1 and Pv(γ = γ1Bv ) where γ1Bv is jointly
measurable, we deduce that
EPv [ξ] ≤ EPv
[
αX +
∫ T
0
γudSu
]
≤ EPv [αX ] P-a.s.
as
∫ ·
0 γu1BvdSu is a G-local martingale bounded from below and thus a G-supermartingale.
Since {Pv} are regular conditional probabilities of P and P(α
λ = αλ(ω)) for each λ ∈ Λ, taking
expectations under P, we have
EP[ξ] ≤ EP[αX ] = α(ω)P(X )
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1:
Note that av can be written as
av(v˜, ω) :=

a1(v˜, ω) on Ω+ × Ω+\{(v˜, ω) : ω|[0,T1] = v˜|[0,T1] ∨ ω|[0,T1] = v|[0,T1]}
a2(ω) on {(v˜, ω) : ω|[0,T1] = v˜|[0,T1]}
a3(v˜) on {(v˜, ω) : ω|[0,T1] = v|[0,T1]}
where ai for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are given by a1(v˜, ω) = ω, a2(ω) = a
v(ω, ω) = v|[0,T1] ⊗
vT1
ωT1
ω|[T1,T ]
and a3(ω) = a
v(ω, v) = ω|[0,T1] ⊗
ωT1
vT1
v|[T1,T ]. Thus, since sets {(v˜, ω) : ω|[0,T1] = v˜|[0,T1]}
and {(v˜, ω) : ω|[0,T1] = v|[0,T1]} are FT ⊗ FT -measurable, it is now enough to show that each
ai is measurable. The map a1 is measurable since it is simply a projection. The mappings
a2, a3 : Ω+ → Ω+ are continuous thus measurable. Indeed, fix ω ∈ Ω+ and consider ω˜ such that
||ω˜ − ω|| ≤ δ ≤ 12ωT1 . Then
||a2(ω)− a2(ω˜)|| = sup
t∈[T1,T ]
∣∣∣∣ vT1ω˜T1 (ωt − ω˜t) + vT1ω˜T1ωT1 (ωT1 − ω˜T1)ωt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2vT1ωT1
(
1 +
||ω||
ωT1
)
δ,
||a3(ω)− a3(ω˜)|| = ||ω − ω˜|| ∨ sup
t∈[T1,T ]
∣∣∣∣ vtvT1 (ωT1 − ω˜T1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ||v||vT1 δ.

Proof of Proposition 5.2:
In the proof we denote ξ˜ := V
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ).
(i) Let v := (v1, ..., vd) ∈ Ω and v˜ := (v˜1, ..., v˜d) ∈ Ω. Note that∣∣∣ξ˜((v1, .., vd))− ξ˜((v˜1, .., v˜d))∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
k=1
∣∣∣ξ˜((v˜1, .., v˜k−1, vk, .., vd))− ξ˜((v˜1, .., v˜k, vk+1, .., vd))∣∣∣ .
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Thus, to establish uniform continuity of ξ˜, it is enough to consider v and v˜ which differ on one
coordinate only and, without loss of generality, we may assume that d = 1.
Consider a small δ > 0. Suppose that ||v − v˜||[0,T1] ≤ δ, |vT1 − v˜T1 | = D ≥ 0, vT1 > 0 and
v˜T1 > 0.
In the first step we show that ξ˜(v˜) ≤ ξ˜(v) + ε for an appropriately chosen ε, depending only on
ξ and δ. For each η > 0 there exists a strategy γ such that
ξ˜(v) +
∫ T
T1
γtdSt ≥ ξ − η on B
v.
Let λ = vT1/v˜T1 ∈ (0,∞) and define the path modification mapping a by a(ω) := a
v(v˜, ω) where
av is given in (14). Note that a is a bijection satisfying a = a−1. Introduce a stopping time
τ˜(ω) := τv,v˜(ω) :=

inf{t > T1 : ωt − v˜T1 ≥ v˜T1D
− 1
2} ∧ T ω ∈ Bv˜
inf{t > T1 : ωt − vT1 ≥ vT1D
− 1
2} ∧ T ω ∈ Bv
T1 ω /∈ B
v ∪Bv˜
. (17)
To show that ξ˜(v˜) ≤ ξ˜(v) + ε we will consider a strategy λγ ◦ a+ D
1
4
v˜T1
1[T1,τ˜) on B
v˜. The second
term of this strategy is clearly G-adapted. To show that the first term is G-adapted as well, it
is enough to show that Z ◦ a is σ(Z)-measurable. The last is true since
Z ◦ a(ω) = Z˜
(
a(ω)|[T1,T ]
a(ω)T1
)
= Z˜
(
ω|[T1,T ]
ωT1
)
= Z(ω).
Then, we obtain
ξ˜(v) + λ
∫ T
T1
γ ◦ a(ω)tdSt(ω) +
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ˜ − v˜T1)
= ξ˜(v) +
∫ T
T1
γ ◦ a(ω)tdSt ◦ a(ω) +
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ˜ − v˜T1)
≥ ξ ◦ a(ω)− η +
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ˜ − v˜T1)
where the first equality is due to our definition of integration. In the case that τ˜(ω) = T one
has
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ˜ − v˜T1) ≥ −
D
1
4
v˜T1
v˜T1 = −D
1/4
and and
‖a(ω) − ω‖ ≤ δ ∨ (λ− 1)v˜T1(D
− 1
2 + 1) ≤ 2δ1/2. (18)
Thus, for τ˜(ω) = T , it follows that
ξ ◦ a(ω)− η +
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ − v˜T1) ≥ ξ(ω)− eξ(2δ
1/2)− η −D1/4
where eξ is modulus of continuity of ξ. Hence, for τ˜(ω) = T , we deduce ξ˜(v˜) ≤ ξ˜(v)+eξ(2δ
1/2)+
D1/4. In the case that τ˜(ω) < T one has
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ˜ − v˜T1) =
D
1
4
v˜T1
v˜T1D
− 1
2 = D−1/4
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and
ξ ◦ a(ω) − η +
D
1
4
v˜T1
(ωτ − v˜T1) ≥ −||ξ|| − η +D
−1/4
which, for D small enough (D ≤ (2||ξ||)−4), dominates ξ(ω). We deduce that ξ˜(v˜) ≤ ξ˜(v) +
eξ(2δ
1/2) +D1/4 and conclude that ξ˜ is uniformly continuous on {ω ∈ Ω : ‖ω‖ > 0}.
To complete the proof, we now consider the case where v˜T1 = 0. Let, for some small δ > 0,
||v − v˜||[0,T1] ≤ δ and vT1 = D > 0. Firstly notice that v˜ must satisfy ξ˜(v˜) = ξ(v˜|[0,T1] ⊗ 0|[T1,T ])
since we can buy any amount of stock at price 0 at time T1 thus only constant path is relevant,
and therefore ξ˜(v˜) ≤ ξ˜(v) + eξ(δ). Now consider the strategy γ for ω ∈ B
v defined as
γ(ω) := δ−1/21[T1,σ(ω)) where σ(ω) := inf{t > T1 : ωt − vT1 ≥ δ
1/4}.
Then, whenever σ(ω) < T ,
ξ˜(v˜) +
∫ T
T1
γ(ω)tdSt(ω) = ξ˜(v˜) + δ
−1/2(ωσ − vT1) = ξ˜(v˜) + δ
−1/4
which, for d small enough, majorates ξ(ω). Otherwise, if σ(ω) = T
ξ˜(v˜) +
∫ T
T1
γ(ω)tdSt(ω) ≥ ξ˜(v˜)− δ
1/2 ≥ ξ(ω)− eξ(2δ
1/4)− δ1/2
since ||v˜ − ω|| ≤ 2δ1/4. Therefore, ξ˜(v) ≤ ξ˜(v˜) + eξ(2δ
1/4) + δ1/2.
(ii) Let V 1 := V
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ) and V
2 := V
G,[0,T1]
Ω (ξ˜). For each η > 0 there exists a strategy
γ ∈ A(G, [0, T ]) such that
V 1 +
∫ T1
0
γtdSt +
∫ T
T1
γtdSt ≥ ξ − η on Ω.
Let τ(S) := inf{t > 0 : V 1 +
∫ t
0 γudSu ≥ supω∈Ω ξ(ω) − η} ∧ T . It is a stopping time. Hence
γ˜ := γ1[0,τ ] ∈ A(G, [0, T ]) and satisfies that
V 1 +
∫ T1
0
γ˜tdSt +
∫ T
T1
γ˜tdSt ≥ ξ − η on Ω.
Moreover, for any t ≥ T1, ∫ t
T1
γ˜udSu ≥ ξ − sup
ω∈Ω
ξ(ω) on Ω,
and therefore γ˜ ∈ A(G, [T1, T ]).
In particular, for a fixed ω ∈ Ω, the superhedging holds on Bv. Since V 1 +
∫ T1
0 γ˜tdSt is
constant on Bω, we deduce that V 1 +
∫ T1
0 γ˜tdSt ≥ ξ˜ on Ω|[0,T1] and therefore V
1 ≥ V 2.
To prove the reverse inequality take z > V 2. First, there exists γ1 ∈ A(F, [0, T1]) such that
z +
∫ T1
0 γ
1
t dSt ≥ ξ˜ on Ω. If, for each η > 0, there exists a strategy γ
2 ∈ A(G, [T1, T ]) such that
γ2 is jointly measurable and z +
∫ T1
0 γ
1
t dSt +
∫ T
T1
γ2t dSt ≥ ξ − η, then clearly z ≥ V
1.
We now show the existence of such γ2 for every η > 0. Let {ωn}n be a countable dense
subset of Ω|[0,T1] and B
n := Bω
n
, and denote the closed ball around ωn of radius δ by B˜n(δ) :=
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{ω : supt∈[0,T1] |ωt − ω
n
t | ≤ δ}. Define the path modification mapping a
n,ω by an,ω := aω
n
(ω, ·)
where aω
n
(ω, ·) is given in (14). Note that an,ω is a bijection satisfying an,ω = (an,ω)−1. We now
take {γn}n, a set of strategies in A(G, [T1, T ]), such that
ξ˜(ωn) +
∫ T
T1
γnu (S)dSu ≥ ξ − δ on B
n. (19)
Let us consider γ˜n : Ω→ defined by γ˜n(ω) = 0 if ω 6∈ B˜
n(D) and for ω ∈ B˜n(D)
γ˜n(ω) :=

ωnT1
ωT1
γn ◦ an,ω + D
1
4
ωT1
1[T1,τω
n,ω) if ω
n
T1
≥ δ,
δ−1/21[T1,σ(ω)) if ω
n
T1
< δ,
where σ(ω) := inf{t > T1 : ωt − ωT1 ≥ δ
1/4}. It follows from above that there exists a constant
ǫ(D, δ) which depends on D and δ with ǫ(D, δ) → 0 as D, δ → 0, such that
ξ˜(S) +
∫ T
T1
γ˜nu (S)dSu ≥ ξ(S)− ǫ(D, δ).
The strategy γ˜n is clearly FT -measurable. We also notice that it is adapted to F on [T1, T ]
since it is straightforward to see that for any ω, υ ∈ Ω such that ωu = υu for any u ≤ [t, T ] with
t ≥ T1, γ˜
n
u (ω) = γ˜u(υ) on [T1, t]. Hence, γ˜
n ∈ ([T1, T ]). In addition, we know that for any n,
t ∈ [T1, T ] and S ∈ B
n, there exists S˜ such that S˜u = Su for any u ≤ t and S˜u = St for any
u ≥ t, and therefore∫ t
T1
γnu (S)dSu =
∫ T
T1
γnu (S˜)dS˜u ≥ ξ(S˜)− δ − ξ˜(ω
n) ≥ 2 inf
ω∈Ω
ξ(ω)− 1. (20)
Let us now define γ˜ε by
γ˜ε(ω) :=
∑
n
1Cn(ω)γ˜
n(ω) where Cn := B˜n\
n−1⋃
k=1
B˜k.
It is then straightforward to see that γ˜ε is progressively measurable and satisfies the admis-
sibility condition in (2).

Proof of Proposition refdpP:
In the proof we denote ξ̂ := P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ).
(i) Let v := (v1, ..., vd) ∈ Ω and v˜ := (v˜1, ..., v˜d) ∈ Ω. Note that
∣∣∣ξ̂((v1, .., vd))− ξ̂((v˜1, .., v˜d))∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
k=1
∣∣∣ξ̂((v˜1, .., v˜k−1, vk, .., vd))− ξ̂((v˜1, .., v˜k, vk+1, .., vd))∣∣∣ .
Thus, to prove uniform continuity of ξ˜, it is enough to consider v and v˜ which differ on one
coordinate only and, without loss of generality, we may assume that d = 1.
Suppose that ||v− v˜||[0,T1] ≤ δ and |vT1− v˜T1 | = D ≥ 0. It is enough to show that ξ̂(v˜) ≤ ξ̂(v)+ε
for an appropriately chosen ε depending only on ξ and δ. Take P ∈ M
G,[T1,T ]
Bv˜
, i.e.: P(Bv˜) = 1,
where Bv˜ := {ω : ωt = v˜t for t ∈ [0, T1]}, P(ST1 = v˜T1) = 1 and EP[St1G] = EP[Ss1G] for each
T1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and G ∈ Gs. Define measure P¯ as P¯ = P ◦ a with path modification a given in
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(14). Then P¯ is an element of M
G,[T1,T ]
Bv since P¯(B
v) = P(a(Bv)) = P(Bv˜) = 1, it is a martingale
measure on [T1, T ] as for T1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and G ∈ Gs
EP¯[St1G] = EP[(S ◦ a)t1 a(G)] = EP[(S ◦ a)s1 a(G)] = EP¯[Ss1G],
where the second equality follow by a(G) ∈ Gs. The latter is true since, for any Borel set B, one
has a({Z ∈ B} ∩Bv) = Bv˜ ∩ {Z ∈ A}; the σ-field Fs coincides with trivial σ-field up to P-null
sets and up to P¯-null sets; the general case follows from the monotone class argument. Hence,
with τ˜ defined in (17),
|EP[ξ]− EP¯[ξ]| = |EP[ξ]− EP[ξ ◦ a]|
= EP[(ξ − ξ ◦ a)1{τ˜=T}] + EP[(ξ − ξ ◦ a)1{τ˜<T}]
≤ eξ(2δ
1/2) + 2||ξ||
D
D +D1/2
, (21)
where in the last inequality we used (18), Doob’s inequality and the fact that
P(τ˜ < T ) = P
(
sup
t∈[T1,T ]
St ≥ v˜T1(1 +D
−1/2)
)
≤
v˜T1
v˜T1(1 +D
−1/2)
=
D
D +D1/2
.
(ii) To prove that P
G,[0,T ]
Ω (ξ) ≤ P
F,[0,T1]
Ω (P
G,[T1,T ]
Ω (ξ)) it is enough to note that:
sup
P∈M
G,[0,T ]
Ω
EP[ξ] = sup
P∈M
G,[0,T ]
Ω
EP[EPω [ξ]] ≤ sup
P∈M
G,[0,T ]
Ω
EP
 sup
P¯∈M
G,[T1,T ]
Bω
EP¯[ξ]

where {Pω} is regular conditional distribution with respect to FT1 and where in the last step we
used measurability implied by assertion (i).
Now we will show the remaining inequality. Let {ωn}n be a countable dense subset of Ω|[0,T1]
and Bn := Bω
n
. Define the path modification mapping an,ω by an,ω := aω
n
(ω, ·) where aω
n
(ω, ·)
is given in (14). Note that an,ω is a bijection satisfying an,ω = (an,ω)−1. For any Pn ∈ M
G,[T1,T ]
Bn
the measure Pn ◦ a
n,ω belongs to M
G,[T1,T ]
Bω . Moreover, similarly to (21), we obtain that
|EPn [ξ]− EPn◦an,ω [ξ]| ≤ eξ(2δ
1/2) + 2||ξ||
δ
δ + δ1/2
whenever ||ωn − ω||[0,T1] ≤ δ. Let us consider probability kernel Nn : Ω → M
G,[T1,T ] defined
by Nn(ω) := Pn ◦ a
n,ω. The kernel Nn is FT -measurable, i.e., Nn(ω,F ) = Pn ◦ a
n,ω(F ) is FT -
measurable for any F ∈ FT , since (ω, ω˜) → 1 F ◦ a
n,ω(ω˜) is FT ⊗ FT -measurable and bounded
thus EPn [1 F ◦a
n,ω] is FT -measurable (see [10, Section 3.3]). Measurability of an(ω˜, ω) was shown
in Lemma 5.1. Then, since Nn is constant on atoms of FT1 , we deduce from Blackwell’s Theorem
(see [14, Theorem 8.6.7] and/or [18, Ch III, §26, p.80-81]) that Nn is FT1-measurable probability
kernel.
Denoting the closed ball around ωn of radius δ by B˜n(δ) := {ω : supt∈[0,T1] |ωt − ω
n
t | ≤ δ}, we
observe that
sup
P∈M
G,[T1,T ]
B˜n(δ)
EP[ξ] = sup
ω∈B˜n(δ)
sup
P∈M
G,[T1,T ]
Bω
EP[ξ] = sup
ω∈B˜n(δ)
ξ̂(ω) ≤ ξ̂(ωn) + ε(δ)
where the second equality follows from uniform continuity of ξ̂.
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Fix ε > 0. Then we can chose δ > 0 and family of measures Pεn ∈ M
G,[T1,T ]
Bn for each n such
that
ε/2 + EPεn [ξ] ≥ ξ̂(ω) ∀ω ∈ B˜
n(δ) and eξ(2δ
1/2) + 2||ξ||δ/(δ + δ1/2) ≤ ε/2.
Let us now define the FT1-measurable probability kernel N
ε as
N ε(ω) :=
∑
n
1Cn(ω) P
ε
n ◦ a
n,ω where Cn := B˜n\
n−1⋃
k=1
B˜k.
Probability kernel N ε is constructed such that it satisfies
ε+ ENε(ω)[ξ] ≥ ξ̂(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω and N
ε(ω) ∈ M
G,[0,T1]
Bω .
There as well exists a measure Pε ∈ M
F,[0,T1]
Ω such that ε + EPε [ξ̂] ≥ supP∈MF,[0,T1]Ω
EP[ξ̂]. The
concatenation of measures P¯ε := Pε ⊗N ε (see Section 3.1 in [29]), defined, for each F ∈ FT , as
P¯ε(F ) = EPε
[∑
n
1CnN
ε(F )
]
is a probability measure. Note that regular conditional probabilities of P¯ε w.r.t FT1 equal to N
ε
and d P¯ε|FT1 = dP
ε|FT1 . Thus, for s ≤ t and Gs ∈ Gs, we have
EP¯ε
[
(St − Ss)1Gs
]
= EP¯ε
[
ENε [(St − Ss)1Gs ]
]
= EP¯ε
[
ENε [(Ss∨T1 − Ss)1Gs ]
]
= EP¯ε
[
(Ss∨T1 − Ss)1Gs
]
= EPε
[
(Ss∨T1 − Ss)1Gs
]
= 0
which shows that S is a (P¯ε,G)-martingale. Moreover P¯ε satisfies
EP¯ε[ξ] = EPε
[
ENε [ξ]
]
≥ EPε [ξ̂]− ε ≥ sup
P∈M
F,[0,T1]
Ω
EP[ξ̂]− 2ε.
The proof is completed. 
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